Abstract-The TCP/IP architecture was originally designed without taking security measures into consideration. Over the years, it has been subjected to many attacks, which has led to many patches to counter them. Our investigations into the (1) RINA decouples authentication from connection management, thus transport-level attacks are limited to "insider" attacks, and (2) RINA decouples transport port allocation and access control from data synchronization and transfer, thus making transport level attacks much harder to mount. Using typical field lengths in packet headers, we analyze how hard it is for an intruder to compromise RINA.
I. INTRODUCTION
The TCP/IP architecture has shown signs of weakness as the Internet has grown and evolved. These problems are partly due to changing requirements-including mobility, quality-of service, and security-but partly because of the architecture's rigid structure. In this paper, we focus on the security proper ties that are inherent in the Internet architecture.
As is often lamented, the TCPIIP architecture was originally designed without taking security considerations into account. Over the years, many vulnerabilities have been discovered and led to many patches to counter them. Given its rigid structure, security mechanisms have mostly been inserted into TCP/IP as "shim" sub layers lacking a comprehensive approach to security.
Most recently, there have been attempts to design clean slate internet architectures. Our own investigations into the fundamental principles of communication led to a rather simple, elegant model based on a generalization of Inter Process Communication (IPC). However, this model, referred to as RINA (Recursive InterNetwork Architecture) [2] , was Itc@bu.edu developed from IPC considerations alone, without explicitly considering security. Hence, it seemed wise to investigate its security properties at the outset.
Space does not allow us to consider all aspects of the security of RINA in this paper. (We hope to cover other aspects in subsequent papers.) Here, after a very brief overview of the pertinent aspects of RINA, we consider three types of vulnera bilities that have been found in TCP/IP: port-scanning attacks, connection-opening attacks and data-transfer attacks. What we find is that unlike the TCP/IP architecture, without the aid of cryptographic techniques, the bare-bones architecture of RINA is more secure and resistant to these attacks, even if we assume that a RINA network has been fundamentally compromised. Specifically, RINA decouples authentication from transport (connection) management, thus erecting a hurdle that is not naturally present in TCP/IP networks. Even if this hurdle is overcome, i.e. attacks are mounted by a rogue ("insider") process, by decoupling transport port allocation and access control from data synchronization and transfer, RINA makes it much harder for an attacker to mount such transport-level attacks. Though further analysis is to be conducted, this might suggest that good design is as important to good security as explicit consideration of security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II re views elements of TCPIIP and RINA that are most relevant to the security aspects discussed in this paper, specifically access control, addressing, and connection management. Section III compares the resiliency of TCP/IP and RINA to transport attacks, namely port-scanning, connection-opening, and data transfer attacks. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND: TCP/IP VS. RINA Figure 1 illustrates the TCP/IP architecture. In [2] , we identified the shortcomings of this architecture and attributed them to: (1) exposing addresses to applications, (2) artificially isolating functions of the same scope ' , and (3) artificially limiting the number of layers (levels). Figure 2 illustrates our RINA architecture [2] , which lever ages the inter-process communication (IPC) concept, 2 In an operating system, to allow two processes to communicate, IPC requires certain functions such as locating processes, determining permission, passing information, scheduling, and managing memory. Similarly, two applications on different end-hosts should cOlmnunicate by utilizing the services of a distributed IPC facility (DIF) that provide the same functions plus those required by the lack of a common memory, A DIF is an organizing structure-what we generally refer to as a layer. However, in the RINA model, what functions constitute this layer is fundamentally different, A DIF is a collection of IPC processes (nodes), Each IPC process executes routing, transport, and management functions, IPC processes communicate and share state information, How a DIF is managed, including addressing, is hidden from the applications.
The goal of a DIF is to provide a distributed service that allows application processes to communicate. One use of a DIF might be as a private network or overlay. Two novel aspects of a DIF is that it repeats and is relative. Each repetition addresses a different range of operation and/or scope. As shown in Figure 2 , two IPC processes PI and P2 in an N-Ievel DIF communicate by utilizing the services of an (N-l)-Ievel DIF. Thus, while the specific function of IPC processes is to do IPC, they are also application processes requesting IPC from a lower layer, Our IPC-based architecture can be found in [2] , and [1] elaborates on why layers must be organized as DIFs. In this section, we only highlight key aspects of this architecture that have a fundamental impact on security.
A, Access Control
Unlike TCP/IP, RINA requires explicit enrollment for an IPC process within a system to either join an existing DIF, or create a new DIF. a) Adding a New Member to an (N)-DIF: Suppose that DIF I consists of a number of IPC processes on a set of systems. Suppose that an IPC process, j, wants to join DIF I. j knows the application (service) name of an IPC process, i, in I, not its address -j has no way of knowing the address of 2 We use IPC in its long lost original sense of passing data messages between processes, rather than the broader current sense used today that encompasses this as well as all synchronization techniques. The (N-1)-DIF determines whether i exists and whether j has access to i. After the connection has been established, i authenticates j and determines whether it can be a member of DIF I. This authentication can be as strong or as weak as required by the DIF. If the result is positive, i assigns an (N) address to j. Note that the address is taken from the name space for DIF I, i.e., DIFs have their own name (address) space. j uses the (N)-address to identify itself to other members of DIF I. Other initialization parameters associated with DIF I are exchanged with j, possibly including a shared secret key. The IPC process, j, is now a member of DIF I.
b) Creating a New DIF: Creating a new DIF is a simple matter. A management or similar application with the appropriate permissions causes an IPC process to be created and initialized, including pointing it to one or more (N-l) DIFs. As part of its initialization, the IPC process is given the means to recognize allowable members of the DIF (e.g., a list of application process names, a digital signature, and so on). It might be directed to initiate enrollment with them or to simply wait for them to find this initial IPC process. When this has been achieved, adding more members to the DIF proceeds as described earlier.
B. Addresses and their Binding
The TCP/lP architecture has a global addressing space, which allows any system to freely connect to any other system. On the contrary, in RINA, the addresses are internal to a DIF. For two application processes to communicate, they have to have access to a DIF in common. If there is no common DIF, then one must be created either by joining an existing DIF or creating a new one. This provides the opportunity to restrict access based on the security policy of the DIF.
In the TCP/lP architecture, TCP overloads the port-id to be both a local handle, which identifies the application process, and connection-endpoint-id, which identifies the data-transfer connection. Figure 3 illustrates TCP's management of data transfer connections. And by overloading the port-id again by giving it application semantics as a well-known destination port forces the receiver to rely on the sender's id informa tion for its identity/consistency checking, rather than ids it generated, which makes it easier for attackers to guess/spoof the source port and thwart any consistency checking by the receiver.
Unlike TCPIlP, RINA does not conflate port allocation (which must be hard-state / explicitly signaled) with transport state synchronization (which is timer-based / soft-state). In RINA, applications do not listen to a well-known port. Rather an application process requests service using the destination application-name. The local communication IPC process re turns a port-id with only local significance to the user to use as an opaque handle. The request is translated into a set of policies for an EFCP (Error and Flow Control Protocol) flow. One end of the flow is instantiated by creating an EFCP instance, identified by a different local identifier, referred to as a connection-endpoint-id (CEP-id). The local communication process then issues a create-request to find the destination application and if the request is successful/accepted, allocates the flow. Figure 4 illustrates RINA's management of data transfer connections.
When the communication IPC process at the destination gets the create-request, it determines if it can accept the request. The degree of access control is a matter of policy -it could be quite elaborate, or null like the current Internet. If the request is accepted, the destination communication process instantiates an EFCP-instance with its own local CEP-id, and the result is returned to the requesting application. The source and destination CEP-ids are concatenated for use as a connection or flow id. If the create-request returns with a negative response, it is determined whether the cause is fatal or not. If not fatal, the source communication process may modify the request and try again. If the create-request returns with a positive response, the CEP-id is bound to the port id. Note that each end uses only ids that it has generated to distinguish the flow. By separating port allocation (and access control) from transport state synchronization, data transfer in RINA can be cleanly done in a soft-state fashion and thus can support reliable or unreliable, short or long transfers. If there is a lull in the data transfer that is long enough to cause transport timers to expire, the connection state is simply deleted but ports are not deallocated. Ports are managed in a hard-state application processes '------() Fig. 4 . RINA connections style. After a lull, once data transfer resumes, the connection state is immediately created.
Application Process
RINA uses a soft-state data transfer protocol, built around Watson's Delta-t protocol [3] . This is in contrast to the hybrid hard-state/soft-state approach of TCP. In Delta-t, unless refreshed by datalACK packet arrivals, a flow state is deleted after 2 x M P L (Maximum Packet Lifetime) at the receiver, and 3 x M PLat the sender. Figure 5 depicts a generic RINA sender/receiver. TCP, on the other hand, requires explicit control messages to synchronize the sender and receiver for the purpose of providing data reliability (i.e., no data loss or duplication). This makes TCP more vulnerable to attacks that fabricate such control messages, or cause them to be dropped [4] . It is worth noting that unlike TCPIlP where connection synchronization is overloaded with security mechanisms such as SYN cookies, RINA decouples authentication as part of enrollment when IPC processes first join a DIF.
D. Summary
To summarize, RINA encapsulates a fundamental principle of protocol design that is inspired by Watson's Delta-t protocol [3] : it decouples port allocation from data synchronization and does not overload the semantics of the connection-endpoint id. This principle makes clear that the connection, the locus of synchronization, is just between the protocol (EFCP) state machines and is independent of the user of the protocol (application process). The relation between the user of the connection and the connection is a local binding.
This principle is as important as Watson's proof that bound ing timers is necessary and sufficient for data synchronization / transfer [3] , and thus all well designed data transfer protocols are soft state.
III. TRANSPORT ATTACKS ON TCP/IP VS. RINA

A. Port-Scanning Attacks
Port scanning is often viewed as a first step for an attack, wherein the attacker explores "open" ports to which processes on a system are listening. In RINA, a service is accessed by its application-name-the requesting applications never see addresses nor CEP-ids. In fact they are not privy to any data transfer identifiers. This is in contrast to TCP/IP in which a destination application process is assumed to listen to a well-known port. RINA also supports local access control domains that restrict which applications are visible to the DIF that the requestor belongs to. As described earlier, source and destination port-ids then get assigned locally on-demand. Ports are also dynamically mapped to separate data-transfer (connection) endpoints, and contrary to TCPIIP, ports are not part of the flow/connection id. This makes traditional port scanning attacks not possible in RINA. In RINA, however, the attacker might try to scan application names. But this is more difficult because application names are strings of variable length, a far larger name space. Further more, the malicious user has to be a member of the same DIF to be able to address other members in the DIE Joining a DIF requires that the new IPC process be authenticated, providing further barriers to compromise RINA.
B. Connection-Opening Attacks
In this type of attack [5] , the intruder attempts to establish a connection with the server, impersonating a trusted user A.
In TCPIIP, this attack exploits the explicit three-way hand shake of TCP in which the client and server exchange (synchronize) their Initial Sequence Numbers (ISN) prior to data transfer. A malicious handshake sequence with server S, intruder X, and spoofed client A, may look like:
S : SYN(ISNx), SRC= A A : SYN(ISNs), ACK(ISNx) S : ACK(ISNs), SRC = A S : ACK(ISNs), SRC = A, malicious-data
In this attack, we assume that the attacker X already knows the destination port and IP address, as well as the source IP address. The destination port and IP address are easy to obtain, as they are generally published, as well-known ports. The source IP address is also generally easy to obtain, as this is simply the client that is being spoofed. As this is a connection establishment phase, the intruder can use any one of the ports as source port-id. This attack also assumes that the acknowledgment (ACK) sent by the server and destined to the spoofed system A, is lost or delayed, either because A itself was down or slow (possibly through a separate attack) or the ACK is intercepted and dropped by the intruder X.
The difficult part of launching this attack is determining the ISN of the server. This could be more easily obtained if the intruder is in the middle and observes the (unencrypted) traffic between A and S. Otherwise, the intruder has to guess ISNs, which given 32-bit sequence numbers and random selection of ISNs, involves 2 32 possibilities.
In TCPIIP, the data packet that follows the three-way handshake can contain any arbitrary, perhaps malicious, data. This can lead to attacks such as connection-opening attacks, unless TLS (Transport Layer Security) is used. On the other hand, RINA requires TLS functionalities to be applied re cursively. Specifically, in RINA, the conununicating applica tion processes inherently use a common application protocol for establishing and releasing application connections that includes a plug-in module for authentication. By using this protocol the receiver expects authenticated packets to follow the connection establishment phase, which greatly reduces the risk of connection-opening attacks. A message sequence illus trating RINA's transport connection establishment, followed by application authentication (challenge / response), in the presence of an attacker X spoofing client A, looks like: 
S: data
In this RINA attack scenario, we assume that the intruder X has somehow thwarted the DIF enrollment authentication described earlier, and is a member of the DIF as are A and S, but we note that these are the hurdles that a TCP intruder does not need to overcome. If that is the case, X is able to know the addresses of A and S, i.e., X is launching an insider attack. As this is a connection establishment phase, the intruder can use any source CEP-id. And since in RINA, there is no need for synchronizing sequence numbers [3] 4 , the sender can also use any initial sequence number. Assuming X does not observe the reply with the destination CEP-id, it has to guess this CEP id. Assuming standard field lengths, we take the length of CEP-id to be the same as that of a port-id (i.e., 16 bits), thus guessing CEP-id involves 2 16 possibilities. This makes this type of attack equivalent to port-scanning attacks, in which an intruder may be attempting an unallocated destination CEP id. Such attacks raise more suspicion (and hence, are easier to detect) than TCP attacks that guess ISN.
C. Data-Transfer Attacks
Data-transfer attacks, known as blind in-window attacks [6] , are those where the attacker does not have access to the data packets of the victim connection but still attempts to inject packets that seem legitimate. Forming a legitimate packet requires guessing various fields in the packet's header.
In TCPIIP, the goal of this type of attack might be to abort an ongoing connection by injecting a TCP "reset" [6] , [7] . The damage depends on the application running above the TCP connection. One such application is BGP, where a connection abort would result in entries of the routing table being flushed. In this attack we assume that the attacker knows the destination port and IP address, as well as the source IF address. The destination port and IP address are easy to obtain, as they are published. The source IP address is also generally easy to obtain, as this is simply the spoofed client. The intruder has to guess the source port as well as the sequence number that has to lie within the window of the receiver.
To guess the source port-id, given 16-bit port numbers, we have at most 2 16 possibilities. Furthermore, for each possible source port-id, given 32-bit sequence numbers and say 64KB window size s , we have ��� = 2 13 possibilities for selecting a sequence number that lies within the current receiver's window. Thus, there is a total of 2 16+13 = 2 2 9 possibilities. Note that for larger window sizes 6 , typical of higher bandwidth-delay-product networks, the attack will be easier to launch.
In the case of RINA, the intruder can launch an attack during two different phases of a connection: (1) after the resource-allocation request is complete and before the data transfer phase starts, or (2) during the data transfer phase. Again here we assume that the intruder is in the same DIF, so the attacker knows the addresses of the source and destination IPC processes. 4 Recall that RINA uses a Delta-t [3] style data transfer protocol, whereby new and old data connections are distinguished by connection ids that are assigned for at least 2 x M P L to ensure data packets and duplicates for a particular connection have died out before reusing the same connection id. Thus, there is no need to synchronize sequence numbers for that purpose.
564KB is the default Tep maximum window size, without window scaling options. Note that 64KB = 2 6+10+3 = 2 19 bits. 6 Larger window sizes are possible using window scaling options.
In the first case, the attacker has to guess the source CEP id and the destination CEP-id. The attacker also has to guess other agreed-upon parameters of the connection, such as the QoS-id, though as a member of the DIF, he/she knows the legal range of QoS-ids. Since the data transfer phase has not started, the attacker can use any ISN. Given 16-bit CEP-ids and 8-bit QoS-id, the attacker has 2 16+16+8 = 2 40 possibilities for guessing the CEP-ids and QoS-id for the victim connection.
In the second case, in addition to the CEP-ids and QoS-id, the attacker has to guess the sequence number which falls within the window of the receiver. This guessing involves
40+13
= 2 53 possibilities, assuming 64KB window size. This type of attack is made even harder because of RINA's use of a Data-Run-Flag (DRF) during its Delta-t's style data transfer [3] . If the DRF bit is set, this implies that the sender has no data left to be acknowledged or it is starting a new data run. Thus, the DRF bit periodically synchronizes the sender and receiver, and so setting it incorrectly in the attack packet would raise suspicion.
For example, if the DRF bit is not set and the receiver's connection state had timed out (because it has not been refreshed by new data from the sender), the attack packet is simply dropped by the receiver. Let's then assume that the attacker always sets the DRF bit, along with an arbitrary sequence number, in its attack packet. This attack packet is accepted only if the receiver had no state for this connection. Otherwise, the receiver can verify whether the setting of the DRF bit makes sense, which is the case only if the receiver has indeed acknowledged all prior data packets.
Finally, this type of attack is not possible or harder to launch in RINA for two reasons: (1) RINA uses a soft-state approach in managing connections, thus it does not use explicit connection "reset" messages, which precludes "reset" attacks, 7 and (2) RINA supports the dynamic assignment of CEP-ids during the lifetime of a connection, binding them to the same port-ids that are only locally-visible. This would make it very hard for an attacker to guess the source and destination CEP ids.
i) Blind TCP Data injection through Fragmented IP Traf jic: Zalewski [8] described a possible attack that can be performed on TCPIIP that does not require the attacker to guess or know the aforementioned TCP connection param eters and could therefore be successfully exploited in some scenarios with less effort than that required to exploit the more traditional data-injection attacks.
The attack is performed when one system is transferring information to a remote peer by means of TCP, and the resulting IF packet gets fragmented. In this case, the first IP fragment will usually contain the entire TCP header, including port numbers, sequence number, and other information that may be relatively difficult for a third party (the attacker) to guess otherwise. The other fragments carry the remaining sections of the TCP payload, which would be put back 7 ln a soft-state approach, the connection's state at the receiver is automat ically reset after 2 x M P L if not refreshed by the sender [3] , thus there is no need for an explicit "reset" message. together (reassembled) at the receiver. Instead of attempting to guess TCP header's information such as port and sequence numbers, the attacker may spoof any of the IP fragments subsequent to the first fragment, inserting malicious data into the TCP payload that causes the reassembly to fail. Zalewski [8] discusses the feasibility of such attack. This security problem arises in the TCPIIP architecture because fragmentation/reassembly is done by both TCP and IP-TCP can produce segments that are larger than IP's MTU (Maximum Transfer Unit) size. In RINA, because the transport and routing functions are integrated into the same DIF layer [9] , fragmentation/reassembly occurs only once for Service Data Units (SDUs) entering / leaving the DIE D. Summary Table I summarizes our comparison of RINA against TCPIIP under transport-level attacks. We assume 32-bit se quence numbers, 16-bit port-ids/CEP-ids, 64KB window size, and 3-bit QoS-id. To be able to make a direct comparison, we had to assume that a RINA network had been compromised and a rogue member had been allowed to join-a hurdle that is not present in TCPIIP networks.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we compare a clean-slate internet architecture, RINA, that is based on fundamental IPC principles, to TCPIIP in terms of architectural support for security. We specifically compare the resiliency of RINA to security vulnerabilities found in the TCPIIP architecture. In some cases, to make a fair comparison, we had to assume that a RINA network had been compromised and a rogue member had been allowed to join -a hurdle that is not present in TCP/IP networks. Even so, we found RINA to be more secure and resistant to these attacks.
We focused on access control, addresses and their binding, and data transfer. We contrast the open access of TCPIIP to the controlled access of RINA, which requires an explicit enrollment phase to join a network of IPC processes (DIF). Unlike TCPIIP, in RINA, node addresses (of IPC processes) are internally assigned by a DIF, and are not exposed to application processes. Furthermore, data connections are dy namically assigned connection endpoint ids (CEP-id), which are bound to dynamically assigned ports. This late (dynamic) binding of addresses / ids provides levels of indirection that 210 possibilities to guess destination CEP-id 24U possibilities to guess source and destination CEP-ids and agreed-upon QoS-id 2°� possibilities to guess source and destination CEP-ids, agreed-upon QoS-id, and valid SN make RINA inherently more secure than TCPIIP, which ex poses static addresses and port numbers to applications.
We compare the resiliency of RINA and TCPIIP to transport-level attacks. We show how the static assignment of addresses and ports, as well as the hard-state approach of TCPIIP to synchronizing connection states for reliable data transfer, makes TCPIIP quite vulnerable to port-scanning, connection-opening, and data-transfer attacks. On the other hand, the dynamic assignment of addresses and ports, the decoupling of port numbers from CEP-ids, and the soft-state approach to data transfer, makes RINA quite resilient to such attacks. We believe that this is an interesting result, given that no more consideration of security was present in the development of RINA than in the development of the TCPIIP architecture. One might be led to conclude that strong design is as important to good security as explicit consideration of security. In other words, TCPIIP does not suffer as much from a lack of foresight as a weak design.
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